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Abstract 
 
We consider a general power market with price-sensitive consumer bids and non-convexities 
originating from supply (start-up and no-load costs, nonzero minimum output limits of generating 
units, etc.) and demand. The convex hull (minimum-uplift) pricing method produces the set of 
power prices that minimizes the total uplift payments to the market players needed to compensate 
their potential profits lost by accepting the centralized dispatch solution. All opportunities to 
supply (consume) any other output (consumption) volumes allowed by market player individual 
operational constraints are considered as foregone in the convex hull pricing method. We modify 
the convex hull pricing algorithm by defining for each market player a modified individual feasible 
set that is utilized in the lost profit calculation. These sets are based on the output (consumption) 
volumes that are economically and technologically feasible in the centralized dispatch. The new 
pricing method results in the generally different set of market prices and lower (or equal) total 
uplift payment compared to the convex hull pricing algorithm. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Deregulation of the electric power markets led to a free pricing for power 
realized through the bilateral trade and/or the centrally coordinated price auction. The 
latter usually has the form of a bid-based security-constrained optimization problem, 
which produces both the generating unit dispatch and load schedule as well as the 
marginal price for power [1]-[3]. If the corresponding optimization problem is 
convex, then the marginal price is an equilibrium price: if the market price is set equal 
to the marginal price, then no market player, acting as a price-taker, has incentives to 
change its dispatch/load schedule within the player’s individual (private) feasible set 
specified in the problem. (If there is a set of marginal prices, then there exists a 
marginal price that is also an equilibrium price.) However, if some of the power 
output cost components are not reflected in the generator bids, application of the 
marginal pricing doesn’t guarantee non-confiscatory pricing. This may occur, for 
example, in case of the convex economic dispatch problem, which has fixed unit 
commitment statuses and, therefore, doesn’t account for non-convexities in the 
generator output cost functions such as nonzero minimum output limits and fixed cost 
components of power production. If the optimization problem is not convex, then an 
equilibrium price may not exist and some other pricing mechanism is needed to 
ensure economic stability of the centralized dispatch outcome and non-confiscatory 
market pricing for power [4]. The non-convexities may originate from the flexible 
demand side due to discrete and minimum power consumption levels [5] as well as 
the supply side because of the fixed and start-up costs, minimum output limits, 
integral commitment decision variables, minimum up/down times, etc. It is known 
that the absence of an equilibrium market price for power in uninode single-period 
markets with non-convexities, originating from fixed cost component of power output 
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and/or nonzero minimum output limits, can be traced to nonintersection of the 
aggregate demand and the aggregate supply curves due to gaps (discontinuities) in the 
aggregate supply curve.  
A number of pricing methods for the centrally coordinated markets with non-
convexities has been developed, [6]-[22]. In [6] the new services (units being online) 
and the corresponding prices are introduced in addition to electric power by setting 
the integral status variables to their optimal values obtained from the centralized 
dispatch solution. However, the price for being online can be negative and the 
resulting pricing produces zero profit of generators and is close to pay-as-bid pricing. 
If the negative prices are discarded in order to allow generators to retain their profits, 
then the resulting pricing does not achieve the competitive equilibrium. In [7], [8] this 
scheme was modifies to generate more stable prices by adding extra constraints to the 
reformulated optimization problem that fix certain continuous variables at their 
optimal values as well. 
The nonlinear (discriminatory) pricing for power with market player specific 
prices was proposed in [9]-[12]. The nonlinear pricing in the form of the generalized 
uplift functions that includes generators as well as consumers in the lost profit 
compensation and ensures zero net uplift at the market was introduced in [13], [14], 
[15]. Authors in [16] proposed the minimum zero-sum uplift pricing approach that 
increases the price above marginal cost and transfers all the additional payments (that 
the profitable suppliers receive as a result of the price increase) to the unprofitable 
suppliers to make them whole in the form of internal zero-sum uplifts. In [17] a 
primal-dual approach was proposed to find the market prices that minimize the social 
welfare reduction due to schedules inconsistency and ensure non-negative generator 
profits. Such an approach, however, doesn’t guarantee the opportunity cost 
compensation for generators; therefore, competitive equilibrium at the centralized 
dispatch solution is not achieved. In [18] a semi-Lagrangian relaxation approach was 
developed to compute a uniform market price that produces the same solution as the 
original centralized dispatch problem while ensuring that no supplier incurs losses. A 
zero-sum uplift pricing scheme that aims to minimize the maximum contribution to 
the financing of the uplifts in a model where both suppliers and buyers place bids was 
suggested in [19]. If the demand is fixed, such an approach results in the market price 
equal the maximum average cost of the producers. 
The convex hull pricing method proposed in [20]-[22] is a pricing mechanism 
with uniform market price that minimizes the corresponding total uplift payment 
needed to ensure economic stability of the centralized dispatch outcome. Each market 
player is assumed to have an opportunity to supply (consume) any power volume 
allowed by its individual operational constraints and is compensated for an 
opportunity to supply (consume) the individually feasible volume with the profit 
higher than that obtained when following the centralized dispatch at a given value of 
the market price. In this framework, the total lost profit to be compensated through the 
uplift payments coincides with the duality gap that emerges after the Lagrangian 
relaxation procedure is applied to the power balance constraint [20]-[22]. Thus, the 
convex hull pricing implies that given the market price each market player receives 
profit that is equal to the maximum value of its profit function on the set specified by 
the market player individual operational constraints only. Such payments ensure the 
economic stability of the centralized dispatch outcome. In this approach, the market 
price is the only exogenous parameter that encodes information on the external power 
system and is utilized to calculate the lost profit of the market player. If the 
centralized dispatch optimization problem is convex, then the convex hull pricing 
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mechanism results in the standard marginal prices. In [5] the convex hull pricing and 
generalized uplift approaches were applied to the market with both demand-side and 
supply-side non-convexities.  
The total uplift payment includes transmission congestion and loss revenues 
that determine the revenue adequacy of financial transmission rights [23]. The convex 
model that solves unit commitment problem for practical instances and can be readily 
employed for the convex hull pricing method was developed in [24], [25]. Detailed 
analysis of various aspects of the convex hull pricing method was presented in [26]. 
Clearly, the uplift payments distort the uniform market pricing and decrease 
transparency of the market. Therefore, it is all-important to reduce these payments. In 
[27] it was proposed to reduce the total uplift payment at the expense of having the 
new redundant constraint introduced in the optimization problem. The new constraint 
depends linearly on the unit status variables of all generators. Therefore, to obtain 
decoupling of the relaxed problem into a set of independent decentralized dispatch 
problems the relaxation procedure needs to be applied to the newly introduced 
constraint as well as the power balance constraint. This leads to the introduction of a 
new service (a unit being online) and the associated price in addition to the market 
price for power. 
In [28] the market opportunities of generators foregone by accepting the 
centralized dispatch solution were studied for the case of single-period uninode power 
system with fixed demand and zero minimum output limits of all the generating units. 
For each generator, the modified individual feasible set corresponding to a set of 
technologically and economically feasible output volumes was formulated using the 
additional (redundant) constraints depending on the output volumes of that generator 
only. Hence, no new products/services and the associated prices are introduced in this 
approach. The algorithm excludes the output volumes that are technologically and/or 
economically infeasible from the uplift payment calculation: given the market price 
each market player receives profit that is equal to the maximum value of its profit 
function on the modified individual feasible set, which corresponds to the set of 
technologically and economically feasible output volumes of the market player. The 
resulting modified convex hull pricing approach yields the total uplift payment less or 
equal than that obtained in the convex hull pricing method. If the centralized dispatch 
optimization problem is convex, then application of the new method produces the 
standard marginal prices. Thus, contrary to the convex hull pricing method, the 
modified approach implies that, in addition to the market price, ISO informs each 
market player about the new constraints (which generally differ for the different 
market players) that together with the market player individual operational constraints 
specify the modified individual feasible set of the market player. Such a pricing 
approach can be viewed as augmenting the producer revenue function (before the 
uplift) to include the nonlinear terms representing the penalty functions for the new 
constraints without modifying the individual feasible set of the market player. From 
this viewpoint, the approach proposed in [28] is a combination of nonlinear pricing 
method (with nonlinear terms vanishing at the solution) and minimum-uplift linear 
pricing principle.    
 It was shown in [28] that the convex hull pricing method and the modified 
approach may produce the different outcomes in uninode single-period models with 
fixed load and zero minimum output limits of all units only if there is at least one 
generator with decreasing average output cost function up to the volumes exceeding 
demand (which also implies that the generator’s maximum output limit exceeds 
demand). However, the consideration in [28] was limited to single-period uninode 
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power systems with fixed demand and zero minimum output limits of the generators, 
i.e. the only source of non-convexity was the fixed cost of power output.  
In this paper, we extend the modified convex hull pricing method [28] to 
multi-period power systems with price-sensitive load bids and both demand-side and 
supply-side non-convexities. We also allow for nonzero minimum output limits of 
generating units. For simplicity, we restrict our consideration to the uninode market 
model describing a power system without transit power losses and network 
constraints. In our study, all the market players are assumed to act as price-takers (in 
economic sense). We also outline extension of the method to multi-node systems and 
present an example illustrating application of the proposal for two-node case with the 
network constraint. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the convex 
hull pricing method for both fixed and price-sensitive load cases. In Section 3 we 
define the modified individual feasible sets for the market players corresponding to 
opportunities available for a market player in the centralized power market. The 
proposed modified convex hull pricing method is introduced for both fixed and price-
sensitive load cases in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. In Section 6 we study properties 
of the market prices and the uplift payments resulting from the new method, we also 
consider examples illustrating application of the new approach (including the cases of 
the demand-side non-convexity, multi-node power system, and time-coupled multi-
period market) and make comparisons with implications of the convex hull pricing 
method. The main results are summarized in Section 7. 
 
2. Convex hull pricing 
 
Consider the centrally dispatched T -period uninode power market with fixed 
demand vector ),..,( 1 Tddd , TR 0d , and n , n , generating units. For a unit i , 
Ii , },...,1{ nI  , let tiu  be the binary commitment status variable taking values in the 
set }1,0{  (with 0 for the unit with status “OFF” and 1 for the unit with status “ON”) 
and tig  be the unit output volume at time interval t , Tt  , where T  is a set of time 
periods of a given market planning horizon. Denote as iu , 
T
i }1,0{u , the 
commitment vector and as ig , 
T
i R 0g , the power output vector of the unit i . Let iX  
be the individual feasible set of a generator i , Ii . We note that in the general case 
the set iX  depends on the initial conditions, which may include statuses and outputs 
volumes in the present market planning cycle as well as the commitment and power 
output volume in the previous market planning cycles. For simplicity, we do not 
explicitly indicate the initial conditions as they can be easily incorporated in the 
consideration. The set iX  is assumed to be compact, Ii . Let a unit i  bids the cost 
function )( iiC x , where ),( iii gux  . For any fixed iu , )( iiC x  viewed as a function 
of ig  is assumed to be the non-negative continuous convex function in its 
corresponding domain (which may depend on the value of iu ). The centralized 
dispatch optimization problem (which we refer to as the primal problem) with 
optimization (decision) variables ),..,( 1 nxxx   has the form 







Ii
ii
IiX
C
Ii
i
ii
)(min
,
,
x
dg
x
x
 , (1) 
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where   is the total cost to meet demand. Let us denote by   the feasible set 
specified by constraints in (1), the set   is assumed to be nonempty and compact. 
Together with continuity of )( iiC x  in ig , this ensures existence of minimum in (1). 
Let ),..,( 1
*** xxx n  with ),( *** iii gux   denote an optimal point of (1). If (1) has 
multiple optimal points, then *x  denotes any of them.  
The decentralized dispatch problem for a generating unit i  at a given vector of 
the market prices ),..,( 1 Tppp  has the form 
),(max)( ix xpp
prod
iX
prod
i
ii


 , with )(),( T ii xgpxp iiprodi C . (2) 
We note that )(pprodi  is a proper convex function with the domain 
Tprod
i Rdom )]([ p . Now we are ready to formulate the dual of the primal 
optimization problem (1):  




 









  

 Ii
prod
i
RIi
ii
Ii
i
IiX
R
D
T
ii
T
C )(max)(minmax TT
,
,
pdpxgdp
p
x
xp
 . (3) 
As (3) is the unconstrained maximization problem of the concave function, its set of 
maximizers, which we denote as P , is given by the solutions to   Ii prodi )(pd  . It 
is straightforward to see that P  is nonempty. For a given  Pp , let ix  denotes a 
maximizer of the problem (2), ),..,( 1
  nxxx . Define 
),( ** i
prod
i
prod
i xp
 , ),(   iprodiprodi xp , then the duality gap is given by  


 
Ii
prod
i
prod
i
D ][ * , (4) 
and, according to the approach developed in [20]-[22], represents the sum of 
generator lost profits corresponding to foregone opportunities to supply power in the 
amount corresponding to x  at a price  Pp  by accepting dispatch *x . Since 
prod
i
prod
i
*  , Ii , the duality gap is non-negative. If either of (1), (2), and (3) 
have multiple optimal points, the duality gap is independent of the choice of *x , x , 
 Pp . The convex hull pricing method instructs to distribute the amount (4) to 
generators as uplift payments to ensure that no generator has an incentive to change 
its output given the market price  Pp  leaving aside issues related to market 
power. The following two interpretations are applicable to the set P . First, (4) entails 
that set of prices is chosen in a way to minimize the total uplift payment needed to 
support the centralized dispatch solution [20]. Second, the set P  can be viewed as the 
subdifferential of the convex function D , which is the convex hull of the total cost 
function   viewed as a function of d  [21], [22]. These insights justify the terms 
“minimum-uplift pricing” and “convex hull pricing” used to describe the method. 
 The case of price-sensitive demand bids is formulated analogously. For a 
consumer j , Jj , },..,1{ mJ  , m , let jd , Tj R 0d , denote the vector of 
power demand. To consider the possibility of the demand-side non-convexities, let us 
introduce ncJ , JJ nc  , a subset of the consumers with non-convex demand and 
denote as jv , ncJj  , a vector of the corresponding discrete variables. Let a 
consumer j  bid the benefit function )( jjB y  with ),( jjj dvy   for ncJj   and 
jj dy  , for ncJJj \ . For any fixed jv , ncJj  , )( jjB y  viewed as a function of 
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jd  is assumed to be the non-negative continuous concave function in its 
corresponding domain, which may depend on the value of jv . We also assume 
)( jjB y  to be non-negative continuous concave function of jd , ncJJj \ . Let jY  
denote the individual feasible set of a consumer j . Note that the set jY  may depend 
on the initial conditions referring to the past and/or the present market planning 
cycles. For simplicity, we do not explicitly indicate the initial conditions. The set jY  
is assumed to be compact, Jj . Let ),..,( 1 myyy  , the primal problem takes the 
form 







 
 




 
Ii
ii
Jj
jj
JjY
IiX
CBU
Ii Jj
ji
jj
ii
)()(max
,
,
,
xy
dg
y
x
yx
. (5) 
The feasible set of (5) is denoted as   and is assumed to be nonempty and compact. 
Clearly, under the stated assumptions the maximum in the primal problem (5) exists. 
Let *x , *y  denote a maximizer of (5). The dual problem is formulated as 




















 

 



Ii
prod
i
Jj
cons
j
R
Ii
ii
Jj
jj
Ii Jj
ji
JjY
IiX
R
D
T
jj
ii
T
CBU
)()(min
)()(maxmin T
,
,
,
pp
xydgp
p
y
x
yxp

, (6) 
with the consumer profit functions  
),(max)( j
cons
jY
cons
j
jj
ypp
y


 , jjjj
cons
j B dpyyp
T)(),(  . (7) 
Since (6) is unconstrained minimization problem of the convex function, its set of 
minimizers P  is given by the solutions to    Ii prodiJj consj )()(}0{ pp  . For 
a given  Pp , let us denote as x  and y  maximizers of (2) and (7) respectively 
and let ),( ** jconsjconsj yp  , ),(
  jconsjconsj yp . The duality gap is given by 
 
 
 
Jj Ii
prod
i
prod
i
cons
j
cons
j
D UU ][][ **  . (8) 
The duality gap is non-negative and gives the total lost profit of consumers and 
producers due to the difference between the optimal values of output (consumption) 
volumes in the decentralized dispatch and these volumes set by the centralized 
dispatch for a given market price  Pp . In the convex hull pricing mechanism, the 
market participants are entitled to compensations of these lost profits to ensure 
equilibrium of the centralized dispatch solution. The problem of how to finance the 
calculated uplift payments is beyond the scope of the present paper, but we have the 
following comments on the issue. The primal problem solution may imply the cross-
subsidization among the consumers: if it is optimal for the market to operate a unit, its 
output volume is set by the variable cost only without any reference to the start-up 
cost. If the unit’s start-up cost is not fully compensated by the output sales at the 
market price and needs to be recovered through the uplift payment, in the general case 
the obligation to make this payment cannot be uniformly allocated among the 
consumers as no consumer should be charged the cost higher than indicated in its bid. 
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Thus, the allocation of the uplift charges among the market players is generally non-
uniform. Also, if there is no fixed load segment of demand, then the combined profit 
of all the market participants equals U  - the value of the primal problem solution 
since the amount paid by consumers equals the amount received by producers. In this 
case, if the duality gap is present and no outside funds are supplied to the market, then 
it is impossible to compensate each market participant the corresponding lost profit 
obtained from (8). As a result, the calculated market uplift payments can be regarded 
as preliminary as these uplifts are to be further modified to ensure revenue adequacy. 
However, since the primal problem outcome ensures that the total consumer benefit is 
no lower than the total producer cost with some sufficiently low (high) cost (benefit) 
assigned to the output (consumption) volumes that are constrained by the initial 
conditions (as well as the fixed segment of demand), the lost profit (if any) associated 
with the opportunity to produce (consume) exactly these constrained volumes can be 
fully compensated by the market players without a need for the external funding. 
Thus, the market budget suffices to ensure the non-confiscatory pricing. 
Clearly, if the primal and/or the dual problems have multiple solutions, then 
the duality gap is independent of the choice of both *x , *y  and x , y  as well as 
 Pp . To illustrate implications of the convex hull pricing we consider two 
examples. (For simplicity, throughout the present paper in case of uninode single-
period market models we omit the vector notations and reference to the time period 
and assume that all the generating units are initially offline. Also, in this case the fixed 
cost corresponds to either start-up and/or no-load cost, for brevity we will refer to it as 
the start-up cost.)  
Example 1. 
Consider a uninode single-period power system with one consumer and one producer. 
The consumer benefit function is bddB )( , max0 dd  , so that it submits one-step 
bid with a price b . The producer has cost function wuagxC )(  with the start-up 
cost w , 0w , and output g , max0 gg  , so that its generating unit has zero 
minimum output limit and linear variable cost. The parameters are assumed to satisfy 
0a , bgwa  max/ , and wadbd  maxmax , which imply maxmax gd  . In this 
setting, the consumer is not able to compensate the total cost of power production for 
output in the range max0 dg  , hence 0***  dgu . The convex hull pricing 
results in the unique market price max/ gwap   and zero uplift payment to the 
producer and the uplift of max)( dpb   payable to the consumer (the source of funds 
for the payment is not discussed here). The convex hull pricing method states that the 
consumer has lost the opportunity to consume the power volume maxd  by accepting 
the centralized dispatch and is entitled for the compensation. The mathematical reason 
for the nonzero consumer’s uplift is the price dependence on maxg , which is neither 
technologically feasible given the power balance constraint nor economically feasible 
for the stated benefit and cost functions. In addition, we observe that the consumer is 
not able to buy any power volume from the producer at all. Therefore, it had not 
deprived the consumer of any other market opportunities. As maxg  increases, the 
market price tends to a  and uplift payment to the consumer grows, while no 
opportunities foregone by accepting the centralized dispatch outcome emerge for the 
market players. 
Example 2. 
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Consider a uninode single-period power system with a single producer from the 
Example 1 and an (inverse) demand given by )/1(2)( maxddadp   with the 
consumption volume d , max0 dd  . The latter corresponds to the consumer benefit 
function max2 /2)( dadaddB  . The parameters are assumed to satisfy 
maxmax/6 gdaw  , which ensures that the only solution of the primal problem is 
given by 1* u , 2/max** ddg   with wadU -4/max . The marginal price equals a , 
which means that some segment of demand with prices equal or just above a  was 
cleared by the market. If )(dp  is an aggregate (inverse) demand of a pool of small 
consumers and no consumer is required to pay the cost above indicated in its bid, then 
some part of demand will not contribute to compensation of the generator‘s start-up 
cost and, therefore, the primal problem solution implies the cross-subsidization 
between the different segments of demand.  
The solution for the dual problem yields the unique market price 
max/ gwap  , which gives 2/)]/(1[ maxmax dagwd   and two solutions for the 
generating unit status and output variables: the unit being online producing maxgg   
and the unit being offline with 0g . The uplift is given by 



  2max
max
max
max
)2(2
1
ga
wd
g
dwUU D , (9) 
which vanishes as 0w  since in the absence of the start-up cost the primal problem 
can be transformed into the convex optimization problem with no duality gap. We 
observe that both the price p  and the duality gap, which is equal to the total uplift 
(9), depend on maxg . That seems counterintuitive since the technologically feasible 
output (consumption) volumes are given by the range ] ,0[ maxd  and the output volumes 
in the range ],( maxmax gd  exceed the maximum consumption volume maxd  and thus are 
not technologically feasible. Also, the technologically feasible consumption volumes 
from the range ],( max* dd  have prices below a  and, hence, are economically infeasible 
as this segment of demand is not able to cover even the marginal cost of output2. 
Hence, the technologically feasible output volumes in the range ] ,( max* dd  are not 
economically feasible.  
In these examples, the price p  dependence on maxg , which exceeds 
technologically and/or economically feasible output volumes, raises a question if 
some opportunities, treated as foregone in the lost profit calculation (8), actually 
cannot be realized and, therefore, should not be taken into account in the lost profit 
calculation for a given value of the market price.  
The examples above show that some opportunities that are considered as lost 
in the convex hull pricing mechanism are either technologically and/or economically 
infeasible, and hence the opportunities available to the market players in a centralized 
dispatch should be thoroughly examined. In the next section we identify the output 
(consumption) volumes that are economically and technologically feasible in the 
                                                 
2 Another economic constraint is wuaggB )( , max0 udg  , }1,0{u , stating that the 
demand is able to pay for the generator total output cost. It is straightforward to check that this 
constraint excludes only some of the output volumes in the range ],( max* dd , while the 
condition agp )(  discards all of them. 
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centralized dispatch and for each market player define the modified individual 
feasible set. These sets are further utilized in Section 4 in formulation of the proposed 
modified convex hull pricing method.  
 
3. The modified individual feasible sets of the market players 
 
To ensure the economic stability of the centralized dispatch outcome the lost 
profit compensations for the market players have to be introduced in the market. Since 
a market player not satisfied with the centralized dispatch outcome (including the 
corresponding pricing) may attempt to deviate from the centralized dispatch and 
consumption schedule in the real time, we need to specify pricing method for power 
sold/bought in the real-time market. We propose applying the following market 
principles: 
1. A producer (consumer) is regarded as having an opportunity to 
supply (consume) some output (consumption) volume iff this volume 
could be scheduled in the centralized dispatch. 
2. Any deviation from the generation or consumption schedule set by 
the centralized dispatch outside the certain error thresholds (except 
for that incurred due to participation in the power balancing) is 
economically discouraged. 
The second principle implies that non-conformance of a market player with the 
centralized dispatch leads to deviation charges that exceed the expected profit from 
such actions. Thus, in order to have a desired output (consumption) schedule, the 
market player is encouraged to schedule it in the centralized dispatch. One way to 
achieve that is to sign the bilateral contracts with the other market players for this 
schedule.  
To calculate the lost profit we need to identify a set of output (consumption) 
volumes that can be scheduled in the centralized dispatch and the corresponding 
profits at a given market price. We refer to the set of these volumes as technologically 
and economically feasible output (consumption) volumes for a producer (consumer).  
In the examples 1 and 2 with one producer and one consumer it is natural to 
define the corresponding technologically and economically feasible output volumes 
for the producer as all output volumes that satisfy both the technological constraints 
(power balance constraints and individual market player constraints) and economic 
constraints (ability of demand to compensate the total production cost and ability of 
each segment of demand to pay the marginal cost of output), i.e. all output volumes 
satisfying ),()( guCgB  , max0 udg  , }1,0{u , and for nonzero output we also 
require ),()( guCgB gg  . The power balance constraints ensure that these are also 
the sets of technologically and economically feasible consumption volumes for the 
corresponding consumers. We observe that each output (consumption) volume 
belonging to the set for a given producer (consumer) can be obtained as a solution to 
the primal problem with some new values of maxg  and maxd  no higher than their 
original values. 
 To find technologically and economically feasible output (consumption) 
volumes in a more general setting let us consider a hypothetical set of bilateral 
contracts for power that a given market player may sign with the other market 
participant (both generators and consumers). We require the resulting contracted 
schedule to belong to the feasible set of the primal optimization problem, which 
implies that the nonzero output (consumption) volumes in the present market planning 
10 
 
horizon constrained due to the market player individual operational constraints (such 
as fixed segment of demand, minimum output volumes of the units that were 
committed in the previous market planning cycle(s) and have to be online because of 
the minimum up time constraints) have to be fully contracted. In the considered 
bilateral contract framework, the market player pays the producers the full costs of 
contracted output according to their bids and collects payments from the consumers in 
the amounts equal to the values of their benefit functions at the respective contracted 
consumption volumes except for the abovementioned constrained output 
(consumption) volumes with the sunk cost (benefit), which can be formally assigned 
any arbitrary low (high) value.  
In this hypothetical setting, for every time period of the given market planning 
cycle only the market participants with contracts are allowed to participate in the 
centralized dispatch optimization problem with their original bids and volumes not 
exceeding the contracted output (consumption) volumes, while the market player in 
question submits its original bid with volume not exceeding the netted contracted 
volume for each time period. Thus, these contracted volumes are not mandatory for 
inclusion into the dispatch (they can be viewed as the financial contracts accounted 
for at the financial settlement stage only), while uncontracted volumes do not 
participate in the dispatch. We will use this theoretical bilateral contract construction 
to identify the output (consumption) volumes that can be supplied (consumed) in the 
centralized dispatch, i.e. technologically and economically feasible output 
(consumption) volumes.  
We emphasize that in the general case this approach is more restrictive than 
merely adding the requirement that the consumers are able to pay the producers the 
total output cost with the proper treatment of the sunk cost (benefit) incurring in the 
present market planning horizon due to the initial condition for the market players. 
Consider the case when demand is fixed and given by the vector d . We say 
that a generator 0i  has an opportunity to supply an output volume 0ig  if the generator 
can sign the bilateral contracts with the other market players (both producers and 
consumers) with i -th generator having an output volume ig  and the corresponding 
status iu , ii Xx , so that the load is fully contracted and the resulting regime can 
be realized as the centralized dispatch. This is formalized as the following condition 
for ),..,( 1 nxxx  : 








Ii
ii
IiX
C
Ii
i
ii
)(minarg
,
,
xx
dg
xx
x
x
, (10) 
where xx   denotes a set of the inequality constraints ti
t
i uu  , titi gg  , Ii , 
Tt  . From (10) it follows that each x  belongs to the feasible set of the primal 
problem: x . Let   be the set of all x  that satisfy (10). Since, in addition to 
supplying output 
0i
g , the producer 0i  merely acts as an intermediary (retaining the 
market surplus with the proper treatment of the sunk cost (benefit)), the set   is 
independent of the choice of 0i . For a producer i , we denote as 
prod
i  a set of all 
),( iii   gux  such that x  for some ix , Ii , ii  . Equivalently, the set 
prod
i   can be defined as a projection of   on iX  . The set of these i g  is referred to 
11 
 
as the set of the technologically and economically feasible output volumes for a 
producer i . Generally, i
prod
i X , prodiIi   , but 
prod
iIi


. Clearly, the 
original centralized dispatch outcome *x  can be realized through a set of bilateral 
contracts, since it satisfies (10). Thus, we have *x  and prodii *x , Ii . 
We also note that the resulting sets   and prodi , Ii , generally depend on the 
initial conditions for a given market planning horizon. 
 We note that (10) can be reformulated to exclude x  from the constraint set of 
the optimization problem. Clearly, x  satisfies (10) iff 








Ii
ii
IiX
C
Ii
i
ii
)(minarg
,
,
xx
dg
xx
x
x

 
for some x . Thus, the condition (10) can be interpreted in the following intuitive 
way. For definiteness, consider the case when each time period of a given market 
planning cycle is given by one hour. For each generator in the power system, let us 
take any set of hourly output volumes allowed by the generator individual operational 
constraints as new hourly maximum output limits of the generator (without changing 
any other technical parameters of the generating units) and consider the new primal 
problem. If the resulting centralized dispatch problem is feasible, it will produce some 
new hourly output volumes for each generator. Clearly, these output volumes with the 
appropriate values of the binary status variables satisfy (10). As we simultaneously 
vary the set of new hourly maximum output limits of all the generators in the power 
system and find the new centralized dispatch outputs, for each generator we obtain a 
set of technologically and economically feasible output volumes (with prodi  being the 
corresponding status-output set). In this setting, the hypothetical bilateral contracts are 
utilized to provide an economic framework in which the market players participate in 
the centralized dispatch market not only with their actual values of the hourly 
maximum output limits but also with the reduced ones. 
Another interpretation of (10) is that starting with value of the objective 
function  Ii iiC )(x  at a point x , this value cannot be increased by reducing the 
output volumes of the generators (without increasing output of some generator) 
staying within a feasible set of (1).  
Let sunk
i
C  denote the sunk cost of a generator i  in the present market planning 
cycle3. For each unit i , introduce a set prodi : 
})(,|{ sunkiiiii
prod
i i
CCX  xxx . (11) 
Clearly, the set prodi  satisfies iprodi X  for the given initial condition for a unit i  
and reflects the generator’s option not to participate in the market4 except for the 
cases of units being online due to previous commitment that cannot be altered, must-
                                                 
3 For the case of non-negative pricing, it is natural to define the sunk cost as )(min iiX
sunk CC
ii
i
x
x 
 . 
4 Alternative (non-equivalent) definition of prodi , which also ensures non-confiscatory pricing, is a 
subset of (11) defined as 
1||||
,
,
)(
,
T
0
minarg






p
p
p
x
x
x
gp
T
sunk
iii
ii
i
R
CC
X
i
prod
i . 
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run statuses, etc. We propose defining the modified individual feasible set for a 
generator i  as follows:  

prod
ii
ii
prod
i
prod
iiiX


x
εxε ),()(~ , Ii , (12) 
where Ti R 0ε  (i.e., ),..,( 1 Tiii ε , 0>ti , },..,1{ Tt ), and 
}},..,1{,,|{),( TtggX ti
t
i
t
iiiiii
prod
i  xxεx , Ii .  (13) 
Utilization of the set prodi  in (12) ensures the non-confiscatory pricing for the unit i  
as its profit obtained from the dual problem solution for a market price p  is no lower 
than ),( i
prod
i xp , prodii x . If for each time interval of the given market planning 
period the market price in non-negative, then the loss (if any) of the generator i  is 
limited by the sunk cost sunk
i
C . If minimum of a generator i  cost is attained only when 
it is offline in all the time periods of a given market planning cycle and this is allowed 
by the unit’s operational constraints for the given initial conditions, then 0sunk
i
C  and 
(11) implies that prodi  contains only the element 0 ii gu . In this case, definition 
(12) of )(~ iiX ε  guarantees non-negativity of the unit i  profit. 
The inclusion of the set ),( ii
prod
i εx , Ti R 0ε , for each element prodii x , is 
needed to indicate in the dual problem whether at a given price the generator is 
willing to supply some more/less power than tig  belonging to its individual feasible 
set iX . Thus, for each ig  with prodii x , the sets )(
~
iiX ε  and iX  have identical 
output volumes in some closed iε -neighborhood of ig . By construction, we have 
iii XX )(
~ ε . 
Now we turn to the case when the price-sensitive consumer bids are present in 
the power market. We say that a generator 0i  has an opportunity to supply an output 
volume 
0i
g  if the generator can sign the bilateral contracts with the other market 
players so that the generators have status-output values x  with ii Xx , Ii , and 
the consumers have consumption specified by ),..,( 1 myyy  , jj Yy , Jj  , 
satisfying the following condition: 







 
 





 
Ii
ii
Jj
jj
JjY
IiX
CB
Ii Jj
ji
jj
ii
)()(maxarg},{
,
,
,
,
xyyx
dg
yyxx
y
x
yx
. (14) 
The set of technologically and economically feasible output (consumption) volumes 
for the generator i  (consumer j ) is given by all ig  ( jd ) that satisfy (14). Clearly, 
we have },{ yx . Likewise, let   denote the set of such },{ yx . Instead of using 
generator 0i  to assemble the possible centralized dispatch outcome, we could use any 
other producer (consumer) for that purpose with the resulting set   being 
independent of this choice. Analogously, for each producer i  and consumer j  we 
define the sets prodi  and сonsj  that are projections of   on the set iX  and jY ,  
respectively. For any i , j  we have i
prod
ii X*x  and jconsjj Y*y . Also, in the 
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general case      сonsjJjprodiIi , but      сonsjJjprodiIi . We also have 
},{ ** yx . As in the fixed demand case, the resulting sets  , prodi , and 
сons
j  generally depend on the initial conditions for a given market planning cycle. 
As in the fixed load case, (14) can be equivalently formulated without use of 
x , y  in the feasible set of (14). Likewise, (14) implies that a set of technologically 
and economically feasible output (consumption) volumes for a generator i  (consumer 
j ) is given by the solutions to the centralized dispatch problem with new hourly 
maximum output and consumption limits of all the market players not exceeding the 
corresponding limits used in the primal problem. Also, (14) implies that starting with 
value of the total market utility function at a point },{ yx , this value cannot be 
increased by reducing the hourly output (consumption) volumes of the generators 
(consumer) without increasing the hourly output (consumption) of some generator 
(consumer) provided that we stay within a feasible set of (5). 
Let sunk
j
B  denote the sunk benefit of a consumer j  in the present market 
planning cycle. For a consumer j , the set consj  is introduced to ensure the non-
confiscatory pricing for power except for the sunk benefit sunk
j
B  and is given by 
})(,|{ sunkjjjjj
cons
j j
BBY  yyy . (15) 
Similarly, we define the modified individual feasible set for a market player in 
case of price-sensitive consumer bids. The set for a generator i  is defined by (12) with 
some Ti R 0ε , while )(
~
jjY ρ  - the modified individual feasible set for a consumer j  
is given by5 

cons
jj
jj
cons
j
cons
jjjY


y
ρyρ ),()(~ , 
where }},..,1{,,|{),( TtddY tjtjtjjjjjjconsj  yyρy  with some 
T
j R 0ρ , 
Jj . The expression (15) for consj  ensures the non-confiscatory pricing for a 
consumer j  because its profit obtained from the dual problem solution for a market 
price p  is no lower than ),( j
cons
j yp , consjj y . In the simple case, when a 
consumer j  with no demand-side non-convexity has price-insensitive consumption 
volume minjd  and consumes some additional power only if the prices are sufficiently 
low, the set consj  contains only the element minjj dd   and )( minjjsunk BB j d . We note 
that )(~ jjY ρ  may not be compact.  
We also note that since all x  in the fixed load case and all },{ yx  in the case 
with price-sensitive consumer bids are primal feasible, the right-hand sides of (10) 
                                                 
5 Likewise, to ensure the non-confiscatory pricing the set consj  can be alternatively defined as 

1||||
,
,
)(
,
T
0
minarg





p
p
p
y
y
y j
dp
T
sunk
jjj
jjR
BB
Y
j
cons
j , which is a subset of (15).  
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and (14) define the respective self-correspondence   with a range  . Thus, 
(10) and (14) imply that   is a set of fixed points of that correspondence. 
 
4. The modified convex hull pricing for systems with the fixed load 
 
Let us define the modified primal problem 







Ii
ii
IiX
C
Ii
i
iii
)(min)(~
),(~
,
xε
dg
εx
x
      (16) 
with some ),..,( 1 nεεε  , 
T
i R 0ε , nTR 0ε . Let )(
~ ε  denote the feasible set of the 
modified primal problem (16). Since )(~* εx   for any *x  - an optimal point for the 
primal problem (1) and  )(~ ε , we conclude that )(~ ε  . Consequently, both the 
primal and the modified primal problems have the identical sets of minimizers. The 
dual of the modified primal problem is 



  
 Ii
i
prod
i
R
D
T
),(~max)(~ T εpdpε
p
 , (17) 
with 
),(sup),(~
)(~
i
prod
i
X
i
prod
i
iii
xpεp
εx


 . (18) 
We note that )(~ iiX ε  is bounded and ),( i
prod
i xp  is the continuous function of ig  on 
)](~[ iiXcl ε  for each fixed iu , where cl  denotes closure of a set. (Note that since iX  is 
closed and iii XX )(
~ ε , we have iii XXcl )](
~[ ε .) Therefore: 
),(max),(~
)](~[ i
prod
iXcli
prod
i
iii
xpεp
εx


 , Ii . (19) 
Since each ),(~ i
prod
i εp  is a point-wise maximum of the function linear in p , it is 
convex in p  with well-defined subdifferential with respect to p  denoted as 
),(~ i
prod
i εp . It is straightforward to verify that a set of maximizers for (17), which 
we denote as )(~ εP , is nonempty. Clearly, )(~ εP  is a set of prices that solve 
   Ii iprodi ),(~ εpd  . For )(
~~ εp P , let ix
~  denote a maximizer for the problem 
(19), and let us define ),~()(~ ** i
prod
i
prod
i xpε
  , )~,~()(~   iprodiprodi xpε  . The duality 
gap is given by  


 
Ii
prod
i
prod
i
D )](~)(~[)(~)(~ * εεεε  . 
Relation iii XX )(
~ ε , Ii , implies )(~ εDD   . Hence,   )(~)(~ εεDD , which 
entails the following relation between the duality gaps of the original and the modified 
optimization problems: 
DD   )(~)(~0 εε , nTR 0ε . 
Therefore, the total uplift needed to support the centralized dispatch solution 
)(~~ εp  P  in the modified optimization problem (16) is no higher than that for the 
original problem (1),  Pp . We propose computing the set of market prices and 
the individual uplifts )](~)(~[ * εε prodi
prod
i    in the limit as 0ε . We note that if 
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there is an obligation to compensate the sunk cost (for example, if this cost originates 
from the commitment in the previous market planning period), then such an obligation 
is not a part of the considered total uplift payment [20]. 
A price p  is said to support the primal problem solution *x  in the 
decentralized dispatch problem if 
 )(max arg T* iiiXi Cii xgpx x   , Ii . (20) 
It is straightforward to verify that a price that supports the primal problem solution in 
the decentralized dispatch problem exists iff the duality gap is zero. In this case, the 
set of prices that support solution *x  is the same for all *x  (if the primal problem has 
multiple solutions) and is identical to a set of maximizers for the dual optimization 
problem. The substitution of iX  by )](
~[ iiXcl ε  in (20) yields the definition of a price 
that supports the solution *x  in the modified decentralized dispatch problem. 
Let us consider the case of uninode multi-period power system without non-
convexities: no fixed costs, zero minimum output limits of all the units, no minimum 
up/down time, etc. Since in this case the primal problem can be transformed into the 
convex optimization problem with zero duality gap, the total uplift payment equals 
zero in both methods. The sets of prices that support solution *x i  in the decentralized 
dispatch problem and the modified decentralized dispatch problem are identical as 
implied by the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: If for some i  after optimization over the binary variables iu  the 
function )( iiC x  becomes convex function of ig , then a price p  supports solution 
*x i  
in the decentralized dispatch problem iff it supports solution *x i  in the modified 
decentralized dispatch problem, Ti R 0ε : 
   
 )(max arg T* iiiXi Cii xgpx x     )(max arg
T
)](~[
*
iii
Xcl
i C
iii
xgpx
εx


. (21) 
Proof.  Clearly, since iiiiii XXclX  )](
~[)(~ εεx * , if p  supports *x i  in the 
decentralized dispatch problem, then it supports *x i  in the modified decentralized 
dispatch problem. To prove the converse, note that since )(~ iii X εx
*  , we have 
 )(max arg T
)](~[
*
iii
Xcl
i C
iii
xgpx
εx


   )(max arg T
)(~
*
iii
X
i C
iii
xgpx
εx


. (22) 
For each fixed Ti R 0g , let us define 
)(min )
, ii
X
ii Cc
ii
i
x( g
x
u

 .     (23) 
(We adopt the convention that the value function equals   if the minimization 
problem is infeasible.) By assumptions, )iic ( g  and ][ icdom  are the convex function 
and the convex set, respectively. Likewise, for each fixed Ti R 0g , define  
)(min )~
)(~
, ii
X
ii Cc
iii
i
x( g
εx
u

 . 
We note that )](~[ iicdom ε  generally depends on iε . Also, iii XX )(
~ ε  implies that if for 
a given ig  we have )(
~
iii X εx   for some iu , then ii Xx . Therefore, 
][)](~[ iii cdomcdom ε .  
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We also have )~) iiii cc ( g( g  , )](~[ iii cdom εg  . Indeed, from (13) it follows 
that for a given ig  we have 
 }),(|{}),(),(|{ iiiiii
prod
iiii Xprod
ii


guuεxguu
x .  
Consequently, if  prod
ii
ii
prod
iii 

x
εxgu ),(),(  for some iu , then )~) iiii cc ( g( g  . 
Also, if prodiii ),( gu , then 
sunk
iiii i
Ccc  )~) ( g( g .  
Moreover, (13) entails that ig  we have )](~[ iii cdom εg   and 
][)](~[ iii cdomcdom ε  in the closed iε - neighborhood of ig (note that this 
neighborhood may not be a subset of ][ icdom ). Since 
prod
ii *x , this implies that the 
sets )](~[ iicdom ε  and ][ icdom  are identical in the closed iε -neighborhood of 
*gi . Let 
p  support *x i  in the modified decentralized dispatch problem (19) for generator i . Let 
us optimize over iu  in (22), then the concave function )]([
T
iii c ggp   has a local 
maximum at *gi  on a convex set ][ icdom . Therefore, it has a global maximum at 
*gi  
on ][ icdom , which together with (23) entails that p  supports 
*x i  in the decentralized 
dispatch problem (2) and, hence, (21) holds. The proposition is proved. 
We conclude that for a convex power system both the convex hull pricing and 
the modified convex hull pricing methods result in identical sets of prices, which are 
the marginal prices. Also, Proposition 1 holds if *x i  is replaced by prodii x . 
 
5. The modified convex hull pricing for power systems with price-sensitive load 
 
Now, let us consider the case when price-sensitive consumer bids are present 
as well. The modified primal problem is defined as:      







 
 




 
Ii
ii
Jj
jj
JjY
IiX
CBU
Ii Jj
ji
jjj
iii
)()(max),(~
),(~
),(~
,
xyρε
dg
ρy
εx
yx
 (24) 
with some nTR 0ε , and ),..,( 1 mρρρ  , 
T
j R 0ρ , mTR 0ρ . Let ),(
~ ρε  denote the 
feasible set of the modified primal problem (24). As  ),(~ ρε  and ),(~),( * ρεyx*   
for any ),( *yx * , which is maximizer of the primal problem (5), we deduce that the 
sets of maximizers for both the primal and the modified primal problems are identical 
and, therefore, ),(~ ρεUU  . The dual of the modified primal problem is formulated as 
follows: 




 
 Ii
i
prod
i
Jj
j
cons
j
R
D
T
U ),(~),(~min),(~ εpρpρε
p
 , (25) 
with   
),(sup),(~
)(~
j
cons
j
Y
j
cons
j
jjj
ypρp
ρy


  
and ),(~ i
prod
i εp  given by (18). The functions ),( jconsj yp  and ),( iprodi xp  are 
continuous in jd  and ig  on )](
~[ jjYcl ρ  and )](
~[ iiXcl ε  for each fixed jv  (if any) and iu , 
respectively. The sets )(~ jjY ρ , Jj , )(
~
iiX ε , Ii , are bounded, and we have 
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),(max),(~
)](~[ j
cons
jYclj
cons
j
jjj
ypρp
ρy


 , ),(max),(~
)](~[ i
prod
iXcli
prod
i
iii
xpεp
εx


 . (26) 
(We note that iii XXcl )](
~[ ε , jjj YYcl )](
~[ ρ .) Let ),(~ ρεP  denote the set of minimizers 
for (25). For a given ),(~~ ρεp P , let ix
~ ,  jy
~  denote the corresponding maximizers 
of the problems (26) and let us define ),~(),(~ ** i
prod
i
prod
i xpρε
  , 
)~,~(),(~   i
prod
i
prod
i xpρε  , ),
~(),(~ ** j
cons
j
cons
j ypρε  , )~,~(),(~   jconsjconsj ypρε  . 
The duality gap is given by  




 
Ii
prod
i
prod
i
cons
j
Jj
cons
j
D UU )],(~),(~[)],(~),(~[),(~),(~ ** ρερερερερερε  . 
Since iii XX )(
~ ε , jjj YY )(
~ ρ , we have DD UU ),(~ ρε . Hence, 
DD UUUU  ),(~),(~ ρερε ,  
which entails the relation between duality gaps of the original and the modified 
optimization problems: 
UUUU DD  ),(~),(~0 ρερε , nTR 0ε , mTR 0ρ . 
As a result, the total uplift needed to support the centralized dispatch solution 
),(~~ ρε Pp  in the modified optimization problem (24) is no higher than that for the 
original problem (6),  Pp . We propose considering the limit as 0ε , 0ρ , 
and utilize )0,0(~ P  as the set of market prices and the corresponding lost profits 
)]0,0(~)0,0(~[ *  consjconsj   for a consumer j  and )]0,0(~)0,0(~[ *  prodiprodi   
for a producer i  as the individual uplift payments. Likewise, if according to the 
market procedures the consumer’s payment for the volumes associated with (some of) 
the sunk benefit cannot exceed certain amount (for example, because of the activities 
initiated in the previous market planning period and the consumer’s intertemporal 
constraints), then the corresponding compensation is not included in the considered 
uplift. 
For the price-sensitive consumer bids, (20) is supplemented by the analogous 
definitions for the demand side, and we have the following statement similar to 
Proposition 1. 
Proposition 2: If for some j after optimization over the binary variables jv  the 
function jB  becomes concave function of jd , then a price p  supports solution *y j  in 
the decentralized dispatch problem iff it supports solution *y j  in the modified 
decentralized dispatch problem, Tj R 0ρ : 
 jjjYj Bjj dpyy y
T* )(max arg 

  jjjYclj Bjjj dpyy ρy
T
)](~[
* )(max arg 

. 
Proof. The consideration is fully analogous to the proof of Proposition 1. We also 
note that Proposition 2 stays valid if *jy  is replaced by consjj y . 
Thus, if no non-convexities are present in the power system, then both the 
convex hull pricing and the modified convex hull pricing algorithms result in the 
identical sets of prices (i.e. marginal prices) with zero total uplifts.  
 
6. Applications and examples 
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In this section (except for Example 9), for simplicity, we restrict our 
consideration to the single-period power market. This model is attractive as it has 
exact analytic solutions in simple cases and allows clarifying the essential features of 
the proposed method.  An i -th generator is assumed to have an output cost function 
iiiiii uwgcxC  )()(  with variable cost function )( ii gc  and the fixed cost iw , 0iw . 
The function )( ii xC  is defined on },},1,0{|{
maxmin
0 iiiiiiiii gugguRguxX   , 
where minig /
max
ig  denotes minimum/maximum output limits of the generator i . Also, 
)( ii gc  is assumed to be continuous non-decreasing convex continuous function on 
],[}0{ maxmin ii gg  with 0)0( ic . Initially, all the generating units are assumed to be 
offline.  
Let us define minimum economic output min.ecig  as follows: if 0iw , then 
minmin.
i
ec
i gg  ; if 0iw , then min.ecig  is the lowest solution (if any) to 
)()]([ min.min.min. ecii
ec
i
ec
iii gcggcw   for maxmin.min iecii ggg  ; if there is no solution, then 
maxmin.
i
ec
i gg  . Hence, min.ecig  depends on the generator cost function and its individual 
feasible set iX  only. It is straightforward to obtain the following expression for the 
subdifferential )( pprodi : 









min.min.
min.min.
max
min.min.
/)]([),(
/)]([],,0[
/)]([,0
)(
ec
i
ec
iiii
ec
i
ec
iiii
ec
i
ec
iii
prod
ggcwpp
ggcwp
ggcwp
p
i
 , (27) 
where maxi  is the maximum output volume ig  satisfying )()]([ iiiiii gcggcw   for 
maxmin
iii ggg  , and )( pi  denotes elements (which may depend on p ) no lower 
than maxi . We note that if 0min. ecig , i.e. both 0iw  and 0min ig , then (27) is well-
defined because )0(/)(lim
0
iiii
g
cggc
i


 , which is finite. 
The set of maximizers of (2) has the output volumes, which we denote as 
)( pGi , given by 









min.min.
min.min.
max
min.min.
/)]([),(
/)]([},{}0{
/)]([,0
)(
ec
i
ec
iiii
ec
i
ec
iiii
ec
i
ec
iii
i
ggcwpp
ggcwp
ggcwp
pG  . (28) 
Clearly, )( pGi  is the individual supply curve of the unit i . Note 
that ],[}0{)( maxmin. i
ec
ii ggpG  , p . Thus, if 0min. ecig , i.e. if 0iw  and/or 
0min ig , then the supply curve has a gap: under no value of p  the output volumes 
from the range ),0( min.ecig  are supplied in the decentralized dispatch problem. That is 
the essence of the difference between the optimal generator outputs in the primal and 
the decentralized dispatch problems (and also the problem dual to (1)) because, for a 
unit with min.min ecii gg  , the optimal generator output in the primal problem can belong 
to ),( min.min ecii gg , while the optimal generator output in the decentralized dispatch 
problem cannot belong to that range. From (27) and (28) we deduce 
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)()( pGp i
prod
i  , and, therefore, the output volumes )(pprodi  at a price p  belong 
to the supply curve of the unit i .  
The binary variable can be excluded at the expense of having discontinuity 
introduced in the cost function: let )()()( iiiiii gcgwgf    with 
],[}0{)]([ maxmin iiii gggfdom   and step-function )( ig  defined equal to 1 for 0ix  
and 0 otherwise. Let us further define )( ii gf  for )]([ iii gfdomg   and denote 
by )( i
h
i gf  the closed convex hull of the extended-value function )( ii gf . Thus, 
)(pprod
i
  is Fenchel conjugate of )( ii gf , which implies [29]  
 )(max)(
)]([
i
h
ii
gfdomg
prod gfpgp
i
h
ii
i


 . (29) 
We note that in the general case the set of output volumes that maximize (2) is 
different from the maximizers of (29). Also, the inversion rule for the subgradient 
relations [30] yields 
)()( i
h
i
prod
i gfppg i   . 
Thus, the set of points ))(,( i
h
ii gfg   would be the supply curve for the unit i  if 
its cost function were )( i
h
i gf . This observation simplifies analysis in the numerous 
examples below. 
 
6.1 The uninode single-period power systems with fixed load (no price-sensitive 
consumer bids)   
 
Let us consider the case of the uninode single-period power system with fixed 
demand d  and zero minimum output limits for all units: 0min ig , Ii . Such 
systems were extensively studied in [28], below we give brief summary of that 
analysis. The set   is given by the feasible set of the primal problem excluding the 
points with at least one generating unit with nonzero start-up cost having zero output 
volume and a status “ON”. The set prodi , Ii , consists of elements with volumes 
],[ maxmin iii ggg  , where )0;(max ,:
maxmin    iiIii ii gdg , );(min
maxmax
ii gdg  , 
and the corresponding values of the status variable iu . We note that if both 0
min ig  
and 0iw  for some unit i , then the set 
prod
i  is not compact (when 0d ).  We have 
the following explicit expressions for the sets  prod
iix ii
prod
i x  ),(  , Ii , 0 i , 
[28]: 
 if iig min , then  
]};min[,1|),{(),( maxmaxmin iiiiiiiiix ii
prod
i gggguguxprod
ii
 
 ; 
 if iig min , then  
]};min[0,1|),{(),( maxmax iiiiiiix ii
prod
i ggguguxprod
ii
 
 . 
We note that to guarantee the non-confiscatory pricing for power it is sufficient to 
ensure that )(~)}0,0{( iiX   even if prodi  contains some other elements as well, [28]. 
However, to illustrate application of the proposed pricing method, below we adopt the 
general expression (12). We also note that the resulting sets )(~ iiX   are compact, 
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0 i , Ii . It was shown in [28] that minig , Ii ,  are irrelevant for both the 
price and the uplift calculations, and they can be formally set to zero for all the 
generating units. Let us identify the generating units with min.ecig  exceeding demand 
(named LNMGUs in [28]). For all units, except for LNMGUs, the values of maxig  are 
irrelevant as well, and the original sets iX  can be used instead of )(
~
iiX   in the 
modified convex hull pricing method with no effect on the resulting set of the market 
prices and the uplift payment for each generating unit. Hence, only LNMGUs require 
special treatment in the modified approach compared to the convex hull pricing 
mechanism. 
Now, let us turn to the power systems with fixed load and possibly nonzero 
minimum output limits. In this case, the proposed pricing scheme may result in a 
different pricing outcome compared to the convex hull pricing method even for the 
power systems without LNMGUs, as shown in the example below. 
Example 3. 
Consider a power system with fixed demand d =200 MWh and two generating units 
having iiiiii uwgaxC )(  with parameter values specified in Table 1.  
Table 1. Parameters values for Example 3. 
 MWhgi ,
min  MWhgi ,
max  MWhai /,$  ,$iw  
Unit 1 80 160 20.00 0.00 
Unit 2 80 160 30.00 15.00 
 
Clearly, the primal problem has the unique solution MWhg 120*1  , MWhg 80*2  , 
1*2
*
1  uu . The convex hull pricing results in the unique market price 
MWhgwap /09.30$/ max222   and MWhgg 16021   , 121   uu , (we note that 
there is also the other solution for the dual problem: MWhg 1601  , 11 u , 
022   gu ). The total uplift in the convex hull pricing method is given by $411.40. 
Now, let us apply the modified convex hull pricing framework. Clearly, both 
generators have to be online to satisfy the fixed demand, hence 
])},[,1|),{( maxmin iiiiii
prod
i gggugu   with MWhgg ii 80minmin  , 2,1i , 
MWhgdg 120min2
max
1  , MWhgdg 120min1max2  . For sufficiently small 0i , 
we have ]},[,1|),{()(~ maxmin iiiiiii
prod
iii ggguguX   , 2,1i , with 
)}0,1{()}0,0{(1  prod , )}0,0{(2  prod , and the unique market 
price )/(),(~ 2
max
22221   gwap , which gives MWhp /13.30$)0,0(~   and the 
total uplift payment equals $4.60, payable to generator 2. Details of the comparison of 
two methods are given in Table 2.  
Table 2. The uplift payments for Example 3. 
Convex hull pricing Modified convex hull pricing  
,$* prodi  ,$prodi  Uplift,$ ,$~* prodi  ,$~ prodi  Uplift,$ 
Unit 1 1210.80 1614.40 403.60 1215.60 1215.60 0.00 
Unit 2 -7.80 0.00 7.80 -4.60 0.00 4.60 
Total 1203.00 1614.40 411.40 1211.00 1215.60 4.60 
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 Another specific property of the power systems with the fixed load and 
nonzero minimum output limits is that the set )(~ iiX   generally cannot be replaced by 
iX  even for the units with zero minimum output limits and start-up costs - this is 
illustrated in the following example. 
Example 4. 
Let us amend the power system described in Example 3 by setting MWhg 0min1  .  
This substitution changes neither the primal problem solution nor the convex hull 
pricing outcome. Application of the modified convex hull pricing framework yields 
])},[,1|),{( maxmin iiiiii
prod
i gggugu  , 2,1i , with MWhgdg 40max2min1  , 
MWhgdg 120min2
max
1  , MWhgg 80min2min2  , MWhg 160max2  . For sufficiently 
small 1  we have 
]},[,1|),{()}0,1{()}0,0{()(~ 1
max
11
min
1111111   ggguguX , 
]},[,1|),{()}0,0{()(~ 2
max
2
min
2222222   ggguguX . 
 The market price is unique and equal to )/(),(~ 2
max
22221   gwap , which 
implies MWhp /09.30$)0,0(~   and the total uplift of $7.80. In Table 3 we give the 
unit profits and uplifts in the modified convex hull pricing method. 
Table 3. The uplift payments for Example 4 in the proposed method. 
Modified convex hull pricing  
,$~* prodi  ,$~ prodi  Uplift,$ 
Unit 1 1210.80 1210.80 0 
Unit 2 -7.80 0.00 7.80 
Total 1203.00 1210.80 7.80 
 
Replacement of )(~ iiX   by 1X  in the proposed pricing algorithm produces the same 
price )0,0(~ p  and uplift payment for the second unit but different uplift payment 
for the first unit, namely, 1203.60$))(~( *1
max
11  ggap . Thus, although the first 
generating unit has the convex cost function (both zero minimum output limit and 
zero start-up cost as well as the convex variable cost), utilization of the unit’s original 
individual feasible set 1X  in the proposed pricing method results in the different 
outcome. 
 
6.2 The uninode single-period power systems with price-sensitive consumer bids 
 
For simplicity, we consider the uninode single-period power system with consumers 
having the concave benefit functions )( jj dB  of the power consumption volumes jd , 
jj Yd  , },|{
maxmin
0 jjjjjj dddRddY   , Jj  , with constant parameters 
min
jd  
and maxjd  satisfying  maxmin0 jj dd  and representing fixed part of a consumer j  
demand volume and its maximal consumption volume, respectively.  
First, we consider the case of all generating units in the power system having 
zero minimum output limits. To find explicit expression for prodi , we consider the 
maximum value of a generator i  economically and technologically feasible output, 
which we denote as maxig . 
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Proposition 3: If 0minig , Ii , then Ii  0 : 
 if maxmin
0
< i
Jj
j gd

, then max
0i
g  is the optimal generator 0i  output volume 
determined by solving the following problem (if the problem has multiple 
optimal points, then max
0i
g  corresponds to the one with the maximum generator 
0i  output): 














)()(max
00
0
00
0
,
,
,, iiJj
jj
dg
JjYd
Xx
dx
xCdB
Jj
ji
jj
ii
i
.   
 if maxmin
0i
Jj
j gd 

, then maxmax
00 ii
gg  . 
Proof. The specific feature of the uninode single-period system is that each generator 
competes with the other generators and doesn’t need to cooperate with them to 
achieve its maximum output volume (except for the case when the fixed load segment 
of demand needs to be supplied): if operating statuses “ON”/”OFF” of all units are 
fixed, then a decrease in some unit output will either increase or leave unchanged the 
output of any other unit. Thus, in the case of maxmin
0
< iJj j gd  , we may start with the 
collection of maxig , Ii , reduce some of 
max
ig  (except for the unit 0i ), provided that 
the resulting centralized dispatch problem is feasible, and compute the centralized 
dispatch outcome with the new feasible set. Let us define the algorithm: for all units 
(except for the unit 0i ) set 
max
ig  equal to the new centralized dispatch output volumes, 
then reduce some of maxig , except for the unit 0i , provided that the resulting 
centralized dispatch is feasible, find the solution to the optimization problem with the 
new limits on the maximum output. If the algorithm is run repeatedly, then at each 
step the output of unit 0i  either increases or stays the same. Thus, the maximum 
possible output of the generator 0i  is realized when no other generator is operating, 
which results in the statement of the first bullet. If maxmin
0iJj j
gd   , i.e. the fixed load 
part of demand exceeds the generator 0i  maximum output, then we let all the other 
units produce exactly )( maxmin
0iJj j
gd   . To achieve that, the generator 0i  may sign 
the bilateral contracts for power with each generating unit i , 0ii  ,  to supply       00 ,: *maxmin* / iiIii iiJj jii ggdgg , engage in the contracts with the fixed load 
segment of demand to resell these power volumes, and sign the contracts with the 
remaining part of the fixed load to supply max
0i
g . It is straightforward to check that 
max0 ii gg  . Therefore, the set }{ ig  is realized as the centralized dispatch outcome 
with only fixed load segment of demand cleared. This gives the statement of the 
second bullet. The proposition is proved. 
Proposition 4: If 0min ig , Ii , then Ii  0 : 
 if 0min Jj jd , 0max0 ig , and 00 iw , then 
]},0[,1|),{()}0,0{( max
000000 iiiii
prod
i ggugu  ; 
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 if 0min Jj jd  , 0max0 ig , and 00 iw , then  
]},[,1|),{()}0,0{( maxmin
0000000 iiiiii
prod
i gggugu  , where 
min
0i
g  denotes the 
minimum output, satisfying 







Jj
jj
dg
JjYd
diii
dBwgc
Jj
ji
jj
)(max)(
min
0
000
,
,
min ;          (30) 
 if 0min Jj jd  , 0max0 ig , and 00 iw , then )}0,1{()}0,0{(0 prodi ; 
 if 0min Jj jd  , 0max0 ig , and 00 iw , then )}0,0{(0 prodi ; 
 if 0min Jj jd , then prodi0  is comprised of all elements with the output 
volume ],[ maxmin
000 iii
ggg  , where )0;(max
00 ,:
maxminmin    iiIii iJj ji gdg , 
and the corresponding statuses (excluding the element )}0,1{( , if any, in case of 
0
0
iw ). 
Proof. The proof is straightforward and is based on the observation that if 
0min Jj jd , then we may start with the unit 0i  output max0ig  and, keeping all the other 
units offline,  gradually reduce max
0i
g . If 0min Jj jd , then we also start with the output 
max
0i
g  and gradually reduce max
0i
g  with the other units utilized only to ensure that part of 
(or all) the fixed load segment of demand is satisfied by their output volumes. The 
proposition is proved. 
Contrary to competing producers, a consumer may find it mutually beneficial 
to cooperate with the other consumers to increase its consumption volume: if the start-
up cost is present, reduction of the consumption volume by one consumer may lower 
the consumption volume of another consumer resulting from the centralized dispatch. 
Hence, the consumer may find it profitable to conclude bilateral contracts with some 
of the other consumers even with higher bids. Thus, Propositions 3 and 4 are not 
trivially generalized for consj . We also note that prodi  and consj  may not be compact. 
Now we illustrate application of the modified convex hull pricing method for 
Examples 1 and 2 and show that the total uplift needed to provide economic stability 
of the centralized dispatch outcome is reduced compared to the total uplift implied by 
the convex hull pricing algorithm. 
Example 1 (revisited). 
Since no nonzero power volume can be fully paid for by the consumer, we have 
)}0,0{( prod , }0{сons . Therefore, 
]},0[,1|),{()}0,0{()(~   guguX , ],0[)(~  Y . 
For )/(0 abw   , we have ]/,[),(~  wabP  , and 
0)()()(~)(~ **    consprodconsprod , ),(~~  Pp . 
Hence, no market player receives any compensation and the total uplift payment is 
zero. In the limit as 0 , 0 , we have ),[)0,0(~  bP . 
Example 2 (revisited). 
Let us apply the proposed approach to Example 2 under assumption that there is only 
one consumer in the power system. Application of Proposition 4 gives 
]},[,1|),{()}0,0{( *min dgguguprod   with 2/])/(411[ maxmaxmin adwdg  . 
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The power balance constraint gives ],[}0{ *min dgсons  . Hence, for sufficiently 
small 0  and 0 , we have ]},[,1|),{()}0,0{()(~ *min   dgguguX  
for the consumer and ],[}0{)(~ *min   dgY  for the producer. It is 
straightforward to find that the market price is unique and given by 
)/(),(~ *   gwap , which entails that in the limit as 0 , 0  we have 
0~~ *  prodprod  . Consequently, no uplift is paid to the generator, while the 
consumer’s uplift equals )/(~~ max2* adwconscons   . Therefore, 
)/()0,0(~)0,0(~ max2 adwUU D  . Using the stated assumptions on the parameters, it is 
straightforward to check that 6/)0,0(~)0,0(~ wUU D  , while 
  2/])2/[(2/1 2maxmax wagwdwUU D  . Therefore, the total uplift produced by 
the proposed method is lower than that implied by the convex hull pricing 
mechanism.  
The convex hull pricing approach produces the outcome that is independent of 
the structure of demand: substitution of any group of consumers by one consumer 
with the aggregate bid will not produce a different set of the market prices or a total 
uplift. The proposed modified convex hull pricing method lacks this property as the 
total uplift may depend on the structure of demand as shown in the example below, 
which also illustrates the application of the proposed method for power systems with 
nonzero minimum output limits and price-sensitive load. 
Example 5.  
Consider a power system with two consumers having the benefit functions 
jjjj dbdB )( , jj Yd  , ],0[ maxjj dY  , 2,1j , with parameter values specified in Table 
4.  
Table 4. Parameter values for Example 5. 
 MWhbj /,$  MWhd j ,
max  
Consumer 1 100.00 100 
Consumer 2 15.00 300 
 
Let us introduce one generating unit with MWhgg 250maxmin   and cost function 
wuagxC )(  with MWha /00.20$  and 00.50$w . Clearly, 
)}250,1{()}0,0{( X . It is straightforward to check that the model parameters 
satisfy max2
maxmax
1 dgd  , )( max1max2max11max dgbdbwag  . Thus, the generator is 
either online operating at maximum output or offline. The primal problem has the 
unique solution given by MWhdd 100max1
*
1  , MWhdgd 150max1max*2  , 1* u , 
MWhg 250*  . We have Xprod   for the generator, while for consumers these sets 
are ],[}0{ max1
min
11 dd
cons   and ],[}0{ min1
maxmax
1
max
2 dgdg
cons   
with )/(])[( 21
max
2
min
1 bbwgbad  . For any 0  and sufficiently small positive 
1  and 2 , we have 
XX )(~  , ],[],0[)(~ max11min1111 ddY   , 
],[],0[)(~ 2
min
1
max
2
max
1
max
222   dgdgY . 
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The modified convex hull pricing procedure yields the unique price 
MWhgwap /20.20$/)0,0,0(~ max   and the profits and individual uplifts 
presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. The uplift payments for Example 5 in the proposed method. 
Modified convex hull pricing  
,$~*  ,$~  Uplift,$ 
Consumer 1 7980.00 7980.00 0.00 
Consumer 2 -780.00 0.00 780.00 
Producer 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 7200.00 7980.00 780.00 
 
Therefore, both the generator and consumer 1 uplifts are zero, while consumer 2 uplift 
is $780.00, which is the total uplift in this case. We note that application of the convex 
hull pricing algorithm results in identical market price and individual uplifts. 
 Now, let us assume that the same aggregate demand is represented by just one 
consumer, then its benefit function is )0;max();min()( max12
max
11 ddbddbdB  , 
max
2
max
10 ddd  . In this case, we have }{}0{
maxgcons   with the same as above 
expressions for prod , )(~ X , and p~ . For sufficiently small positive  , we have 
],[],0[)(~ maxmax   ggY , which entails 
)(~)(),(~ maxmax1
max
2
max
11    gpdgbdbcons , 
maxmaxmax
12
max
11
* ~)(),(~ gpgdbdbcons  . 
In the limit as 0 , 0  we have the pricing outcomes summarized in Table 
6. 
Table 6. The uplift payments for Example 5 in the case of one consumer. 
Convex hull pricing Modified convex hull pricing  
,$*  ,$  Uplift,$ ,$~*  ,$~  Uplift,$ 
Consumer 7200.00 7980.00 780.00 7200.00 7200.00 0.00 
Producer 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 7200.00 7980.00 780.00 7200.00 7200.00 0.00 
 
Therefore, the total uplift payment is zero in the modified convex hull pricing 
approach. Thus, we conclude that the total uplift payment in the modified convex 
pricing approach depends on the structure of demand: knowledge of the aggregate 
demand is insufficient for the uplift calculation and the individual consumer benefit 
functions are needed. 
 We also note the following property of the proposed method. If some 
generating unit 0i  with 00 iw  and/or 0
min
0
ig  has both prodi0  and 
prod
i0
  comprised 
of elements with zero output volumes only, then in the limit as 0
0
i  this unit does 
not contribute to the set of market prices P~  and its individual uplift vanishes. 
Indeed, if 0min
0
ig  and 00 iw , then for sufficiently small positive 0i  we have 
)}0,0{()(~
00
iiX  , and the unit’s profit in the decentralized dispatch optimization 
problem is zero at any price. Likewise, if 0min
0
ig  and 00 iw , then 
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)}0,1{()}0,0{()(~
00
iiX   for sufficiently small positive 0i  and the unit’s profit in 
the decentralized dispatch optimization problem vanishes at any price. If 0min
0
ig , but 
0
0
iw , then the unit contributes to objective function in dual of the modified primal 
problem only for prices above )1(//)]([
000000
Owcw iiiiii   , which goes to 
infinity as 0
0
i . Therefore, in case of uninode single-period market, such units 
can be removed from consideration in dual of the modified primal problem affecting 
neither a set the of market prices nor the uplifts in the limit as 0
0
i . In particular, 
this observation is relevant in the following extreme cases: if min
0i
g  of some generating 
unit exceeds the maximum consumption volume  Jj jd max , likewise for a unit with 
the start-up cost higher than the total consumer benefit for the maximum consumption 
volume, - such units can be omitted from the consideration in the modified convex 
hull pricing algorithm for a uninode single-period market. 
 In case of no demand-side non-convexities, there is a question if the original 
consumer individual feasible sets (and, hence, the original demand curves) can be 
used to find the market price and the uplift payments in the proposed method. We will 
address this issue under the assumption of zero minimum output limits for all 
generating units. Let us construct the aggregate supply curve of the modified primal 
problem (24), which we refer to as the aggregate modified supply curve, and the 
aggregate demand curve of the primal problem (5). Each of the curves has at least one 
point for any value of the price. However, the former curve generally has gaps, while 
the latter is continuous. (We note, however, that the aggregate modified demand curve 
for (24) may also have gaps.) The following proposition entails that if the aggregate 
modified supply curve has a point with a price p  and a volume q ,  Jj jdq min , such 
that the aggregate demand curve has a point with the volume q  and a price p, pp  , 
then the corresponding individual outputs (consumption) volumes are both 
economically and technologically feasible, in particular, the consumption volumes 
satisfy (14) with appropriate x . 
Proposition 5: Let )ˆ,..,ˆ(ˆ 1 nxxx  , )ˆ,ˆ(ˆ iii gux  , )ˆ,..,ˆ(ˆ 1 mddd   with 
),(maxargˆ
)](~[ i
prod
Xclxi
xpx
i
iii


 , Ii , ),(maxargˆ jconsYdj dpd jjj


 , Jj , 
for some p , p. If 0min ig , 0i , Ii , pp  , and    Jj jIi i dg ˆˆ , then }ˆ,ˆ{ dx  
satisfies (14). 
Proof. Let    Jj jIi i dgq ˆˆ . Since the aggregate modified supply curve and the 
aggregate demand curve have points with equal volume at a price p  and p 
respectively with pp  , the outputs igˆ  satisfy certain restrictions. Namely, if 
min.ˆ ecii gg   with min.ecig  calculated using original generator’s set iX , then 
maxmin.max
i
ec
iii ggg   and,  as a result, 0ˆ ig  or iii gg  maxˆ . The former case is 
trivial, while for the latter Proposition 3 implies that for 0i  all points on the 
aggregate demand curve with volume igˆ  have prices below the lowest price on the 
modified supply curve of the unit i  with volume igˆ . This contradicts the assumption 
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of pp   given continuity and (weak) monotonicity of the aggregate demand curve. 
Therefore, i  with 0ˆ ig , we have  ieci gg ˆmin.  . We also note that Proposition 3 
yields maxˆ ii gg  . Hence, we conclude that if 0ˆ ig , then maxmin. ˆ iieci ggg  . Consider 
the following optimization problem: 










 Ii
ii
Jj
jj
ddxx
JjYd
IiXx
dx
xCdB
jj
ii
)()(max
ˆ,ˆ
,
,
,,
 (31). 
Now, we show that the conditions of this proposition imply that the aggregate supply 
curve for (31) has a point with the price p  and the volume q . To prove that, we 
demonstrate that for any producer i  the supply curve for (31) has a point with the 
price p  and the volume igˆ : 
),(maxargˆ
ˆ
,
, i
prod
xx
Xx
xi
xpx
i
ii
ii
i



 , Ii . 
Since igˆ  can be formally regarded as new value of 
max
ig , Proposition 4 classifies all 
the possible cases and its application to (31) yields the following.  
If conditions of the 1-st bullet of Proposition 4 are met, then 0min. ecig , 
maxˆ ii gg  , and we conclude that all points on the modified supply curve of the unit 
with volumes not exceeding igˆ  belong to the unit’s supply curve for (31). In 
particular, it has a point with the price p  and the volume igˆ . 
If conditions of the 2-nd bullet of Proposition 4 hold, then the following cases 
are possible: 0ˆ ig  or iii gg ˆmin   or iii gg ˆmin  . In the first case, the unit’s 
supply curve for (31) has zero volumes for any price value and, hence, at the price p . 
The second case is not possible since iii gg ˆ
min   entails iieci gg  minmin. . Due to 
0i  and (30), the total consumer benefit at igˆ  is below the total production cost of 
the unit. Hence, the aggregate demand curve at volume igˆ  has prices below p  only, 
which contradicts the assumption pp  . In the third case, we have iii gg ˆmin   and 
all points on the modified supply curve of the unit with the volumes not exceeding igˆ  
belong to the unit’s supply curve for (31), which has a point with price p  and volume 
igˆ . 
If the 3-rd and 4-th bullets of Proposition 4 are applicable, then maxˆ ii gg   
implies 0ˆ ig , and the supply curve of the unit for (31) has zero volumes for any 
price value.  
If conditions of the 5-th bullet of Proposition 4 are satisfied, then the 
assumption on the aggregate demand curve having a point with the volume q  yields 
ii gg ˆ
min  , which entails iii gg ˆmin   for 0i . As a result, all points of the 
modified supply curve of the unit with volumes not exceeding igˆ  belong to the unit’s 
supply curve for (31). 
Thus, we conclude that the assumptions stated in this proposition imply that 
the supply curve of a unit i  for (31) has a point with the price p  and the volume igˆ . 
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Hence, the aggregate supply curve for (31) has a point with the price p  and the 
volume q . Since the aggregate demand curve for (31) is given by the aggregate 
demand curve for (5) truncated at volume q , condition pp   entails that the 
aggregate demand and the aggregate supply curves for (31) intersect at the volume q . 
Thus, the intersection point is the optimal point of the dual to (31) and satisfies the 
power balance constraint. Therefore, }ˆ,ˆ{ dx  is the optimal point of (31) and satisfies 
(14). The proposition is proved. 
Let us make an additional simplification: assume that each consumer is 
allowed to submit a bid composed of the fixed load segment and/or the price-sensitive 
one-step segment, so that jjjj dbdB )( , jj Yd  , ],[ maxmin jjj ddY  , with a constant price 
jb , 0jb , Jj . If maxmin jj dd  , then jb  can be assigned an arbitrary non-negative 
value. (Inclusion in the consumer benefit functions the constant terms that indicate 
their values at minjd  will not affect our analysis.) For simplicity, we assume 
0...321  mbbbb . We also assume zero minimum output limits for all the 
generating units. Since Jj  the set ][ сonsjcl   is bounded, it has the maximum 
element, which we denote as maxjd . 
Proposition 6: If 0min ig , 0i , Ii , and the aggregate modified supply curve has 
a point with a price p  and a volume q ,  Jj jdq min , such that the aggregate demand 
curve has a point with the volume q  and a price p, pp  , then 
qdd
pbJjj
j
pbJjj
j
jj
 
 ,:
max
,:
min . 
Proof. Let j  denote the minimum value of Jj  such that qdd
jjJjj
j
jjJjj
j  
 ,:
max
,:
min . 
Hence, pbj   for all jj   , and if mj  , then pbj   for jj  . If 1j , then the 
set   }1\{ min1ˆ Jj jdqd  and minˆ jj dd   for the rest of the consumers; if 1j , then the 
set maxˆ jj dd   for all 1 jj  , 

 
jjJjj
j
jjJjj
jj ddqd
,:
min
1,:
maxˆ , and minˆ jj dd   for the 
rest of the consumers. Clearly,  
),(maxargˆ j
cons
Ydj
dpd
j
jj


 , Jj , 
and qdJj j  ˆ . Application of Proposition 5 entails that dˆ  satisfies (14) for some xˆ . 
Hence, maxˆ jj dd  , Jj . From minˆ jj dd   for pbj  , we obtain 
qdd
pbJjj
j
pbJjj
j
jj
 
 ,:
max
,:
min . The proposition is proved.  
Now we are ready to conclude that to compute the set of market prices (but not 
the total uplift) in case under consideration, the original consumer feasible sets jY can 
be used in the modified convex hull pricing method, i.e. knowledge of сonsj  is not 
needed to compute prices in the uninode single-period power systems with zero 
minimum output limits of all units and price-sensitive segment of each consumer 
demand given by one-step bid.  
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Proposition 7: Let 0min ig , 0i , Ii , and each consumer bid is composed of the 
fixed load component with volume minjd  and/or the price-sensitive one-step segment 
with a price jb , then the replacement of ),(~ j
cons p
j
  by )(pcons
j
  in (25) doesn’t 
change the set ),(~ P  for 0 j , Jj . 
Proof. Let us look at implications of the assumption that the price-sensitive part of the 
consumer bid consists of the one-step segment only. Since maxjd  is the maximum 
element of ][ сonsjcl  , );min(
maxmax
jjj dd   is the maximum element of )](
~[ jjYcl  . 
Also, minjd  is the minimum element of )(
~
jjY   and, therefore, of )](
~[ jjYcl  ) as well. 
Therefore, )])(~[( jjYclconv  , which is the convex hull of )](
~[ jjYcl  , is given by 
)];min(,[ maxmaxmin jjjj ddd  . Let us define )( jj dB  to be   outside )](
~[ jjYcl  , then its 
concave hull on )])(~[( jjYclconv   is given by jjdb . Hence, 
min),(~ jj
cons dp
j
   for pbj  , );min(),(~
maxmax
jjjj
cons ddp
j
   for pbj  , 
);min(),(~ maxmax jjjj
cons ddp
j
   for pbj  , min),(~ jjcons dpj    for pbj  . 
Likewise,  
min)( j
cons dp
j
  for pbj  , max)( jcons dpj   for pbj  , 
max)( j
cons dp
j
  for pbj  , min)( jcons dpj   for pbj  . 
Therefore, p  we have: 
)(),(~ pp consj
cons
jj
   , )(),(~ pp consjcons jj    . (32) 
First, we prove that ),(~ P  belongs to a set of solutions to 
   Ii iprodJj cons pp ij ),(~)(}0{  . The set ),(
~ P  is given by the solutions to 
   Ii iprodJj jcons pp ij ),(~),(~}0{  , which is equivalent to  








 
Ii
i
prod
Jj
j
cons
Ii
i
prod
Jj
j
cons pppp
ijij
),(~),(~0),(~),(~  . 
Eq. (32) yields  
       Ii iprodJj jconsIi iprodJj cons pppp ijij ),(~),(~),(~)(  . 
Hence, we need to show that      Ii iprodJj jcons pp ij ),(~),(~0   entails     
     Ii iprodJj cons pp ij ),(~)(0  . These inequalities are equivalent to 





Ii
i
prod
pbJjj
jjj
pbJjj
j pddd i
jj
),(~);min(
,:
maxmax
,:
min   (33) 
 and     Ii iprodpbJjj jpbJjj j pdd ijj ),(~,: max,: min  , respectively. Assume the 
contrary: let the former is true, while the latter is not, then  





Ii
i
prod
pbJjj
j
pbJjj
j pdd i
jj
),(~
,:
max
,:
min  , (34) 
which implies    pbJjj jpbJjj jjj jj ddd ,: max,: maxmax );min(  . As a result, for some 
Jjˆ  we have pbj ˆ  and maxˆˆmaxˆ jjj dd   . Since for any i  the point with the price p  
and the volume ),(~ i
prod p
i
  belongs to the modified supply curve of a generator i , 
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the point with the price p  and the volume    Ii iprod pi ),(~   belongs to the 
aggregate modified supply curve. Also, due to );min( maxmaxmin jjjj ddd  , Jj , 
(33) entails     Ii iprodJj j pd i ),(~min  . Eq. (34) implies that at the price p  the 
aggregate demand exceeds the aggregate modified supply, which is no lower than the 
fixed load part of demand. Let us select a point on the aggregate demand curve with 
volume   Ii iprod pi ),(~  , such a point exists because of (34) and  continuity of the 
aggregate demand curve at volumes in the range ],[ maxmin   Jj jJj j dd . If the point is 
not unique, we take the one with the lowest price. Let p  denote a price at that point, 
then (34) implies pp  . Proposition 6 gives 
    Ii iprodpbJjj jpbJjj j pdd ijj ),(~,: max,: min  . Due to 
maxmin
jj dd  , Jj , 
replacements of minjd  by 
max
jd  for j  with pbp j   yields 
    Ii iprodpbJjj jpbJjj j pdd ijj ),(~,: max,: min  , which entails 
   pbJjj jpbJjj jjj jj ddd ,: max,: maxmax );min(  . This in turn gives 
   maxmaxmaxmax ,,: max,,: maxmax );min( jjjjjj ddpbJjj jddpbJjj jjj ddd   (with the summation 
set being nonempty subset of J  since it includes at least jˆ ), which cannot hold for 
0j , Jj . Thus, we have obtained a contradiction to the assumption. Therefore, 
    Ii iprodpbJjj jpbJjj j pdd ijj ),(~,: max,: min  , and ),(
~ P  belongs to a set of 
solutions to    Ii iprodJj cons pp ij ),(~)(}0{  . 
 Now, assume that    Ii iprodJj cons pp ij ),(~)(}0{   for some p , let us 
prove that ),(~ Pp . We have 








 
Ii
i
prod
Jj
cons
Ii
i
prod
Jj
cons pppp
ijij
),(~)(0),(~)(  . 
Using (32), we obtain      Ii iprodJj jcons pp ij ),(~),(~0  . Thus, we need to 
show that 0),(~)(      Ii iprodJj cons pp ij   implies 
0),(~),(~      Ii iprodJj jcons pp ij  . Let us assume the contrary, then we 
have 


 
pbJjj
j
pbJjj
j
Ii
i
prod
jj
i
ddp
,:
max
,:
min),(~  , (35) 
and     pbJjj jjjpbJjj jIi iprod jji dddp ,: maxmax,: min );min(),(~  . Since a point 
with the price p  and the volume   Ii iprod pi ),(~  , which satisfies 
    Jj jIi iprodJj j dpd i maxmin ),(~  , belongs to the aggregate modified supply 
curve, let us select a point on the aggregate demand curve with the volume 
  Ii iprod pi ),(~  , (if the point is not unique, we take the one with the lowest price), 
and denote the price at that point as p . Clearly, (35) implies pp  . Application of 
Proposition 6 gives     pbJjj jpbJjj jIi iprod jji ddp ,: max,: min),(~  . Therefore, 
we have     pbJjj jpbJjj jIi iprod jji ddp ,: max,: min),(~  . This, in turn, yields  
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   pbJjj jpbJjj jjj jj ddd ,: max,: maxmax );min(  , which is impossible for 0j , 
Jj . Thus, 0),(~)(      Ii iprodJj cons pp ij   entails 
0),(~),(~      Ii iprodJj jcons pp ij  . The proposition is proved. 
We emphasize that Proposition 7 implies that if the price-sensitive part of the 
aggregate demand is formed by the one-step consumer bids only (given the other 
stated assumptions on the power system), then the prices in the proposed modified 
convex hull pricing approach can be computed using jY  - the original feasible sets of 
the consumers, but to calculate the individual consumer uplifts the sets )(~ jjY   are 
needed as illustrated in the following example. 
Example 6. 
Consider a power system with one consumer having benefit function bddB )(  with 
MWhb /00.50$ , ],0[ maxdY  , Yd  , MWhd 100max   and two identical generators 
with iiii wuagxC )( , max0 ggi  , 2,1i , MWha /00.40$ , 00.510$w , 
MWhg 80max  . In this case, the consumer is able to cover the total output cost of just 
one generator. The primal problem has two solutions: MWhd 80*   with any one of 
the generators operating at the maximum output with the other generator being 
offline. Clearly, we have ]}),/([,1|),{()}0,0{( maxgabwgugu iiii
prod
i  , 
2,1i , for the producers and ]),/([}0{ maxgabwсons   for the consumer. For 
sufficiently small positive i  and  , we this implies 
]},)/([,1|),{()}0,0{()(~ maxgabwguguX iiiiiii    and 
],)/([],0[)(~ max   gabwY . Both the convex hull pricing method and the 
modified approach produce the same market price 
MWhgwapp /38.46$/)0,0,0(~ max   . Comparison of the pricing outcomes 
of both methods is summarized in Table 7. 
Table 7. The uplift payments for Example 6. 
Convex hull pricing Modified convex hull pricing  
,$*  ,$  Uplift,$ ,$~*  ,$~  Uplift,$ 
Consumer 289.60 362.00 72.40 289.60 289.60 0.00 
Producer 1 0.40 0.40 0.00 0.40 0.40 0.00 
Producer 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 290.00 362.40 72.40 290.00 290.00 0.00 
 
However, if the consumer original feasible set Y  is utilized in the modified convex 
hull pricing method, then we have the same outcome as in the convex hull pricing 
method. Hence, to deduce the total uplift in the modified convex hull pricing method, 
the set )(~ Y  cannot be substituted by Y . 
 Now we consider an example illustrating application of the method in case of 
demand-side non-convexity. 
Example 7. 
Consider a power system with one producer introduced in Example 5 and two 
consumers having the following benefit functions: 111 100)( ddB   with 11 Yd  ,  
]100,0[1 Y , and 222 80)( dyB   with }200},1,0{|),{( 222222 vdvdvY  . Clearly, the 
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second consumer has non-convexity associated with opportunity to start an operating 
cycle that involves consumption of the fixed amount of power, namely, MWh200 . 
Thus, in this example we have both supply-side and demand-side non-convexities. 
The solution for the primal problem is given by MWhd 50*1  , MWhd 200*2  , 1*2 v , 
MWhg 250*  , 1* u . The convex hull pricing method replaces the non-concave 
benefit function of the consumer 2 with its concave hull 22**2 80)( dyB  , 
MWhd 2000 2  , which gives the market price MWhp /00.80$
  and the total uplift 
of $1000.00 payable to the consumer 1. Application of the modified approach gives 
Xprod   for the producer, }50{}0{1  сons  and 22 Yсons   for the consumers. For 
any 0 , 02   and any sufficiently small 01  , we have XX )(
~  , 
]50,50[],0[)(~ 11111  Y , and 222 )(
~ YY  . Application of the modified 
convex hull pricing results in the same market price MWhp /00.80$~   but zero total 
uplift in the limit 01   since the consumer 1 consumption volumes in the range 
]100,50( 1  are excluded from the lost profit calculation. The outcomes of the both 
pricing methods are given in Table 8. 
Table 8. The uplift payments for Example 7. 
Convex hull pricing Modified convex hull pricing  
,$*  ,$  Uplift,$ ,$~*  ,$~  Uplift,$ 
Consumer 1 1000.00 2000.00 1000.00 1000.00 1000.00 0.00 
Consumer 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Producer 14950.00 14950.00 0.00 14950.00 14950.00 0.00 
Total 15950.00 16950.00 1000.00 15950.00 15950.00 0.00 
 
6.3 The two-node single-period power system with fixed load 
 
So far, we have considered uninode single-period power systems only. 
However, the proposed approach is straightforwardly extended to more complex 
power systems, which include multiple nodes, power losses, etc., by including the 
additional constraints in (10) and (14). We give an example that illustrates application 
of the method for a two-node single-period power system with the network constraint. 
Example 8. 
Consider a system comprised of two nodes connected by a line with transmission 
capacity of 100 MW. The system has one fixed load consumer and two producers. 
Both producer 1 and the fixed load of 150 MWh are located in node 1, while producer 
2 is connected to a node 2. The market player parameters are given in Table 9. 
Table 9. Parameter values for Example 8. 
 MWhgi ,
min  MWhgi ,
max  MWhai /,$  ,$iw  
Producer 1 100 200 15.00 20.00 
Producer 2 150 200 10.00 0.00 
 
Clearly, generator 2 is constrained to be offline in the primal problem solution, which 
is given by 1*1 u , MWhg 150*1  , 0*2*2  gu . The convex hull pricing method 
replaces the non-convex cost functions of the producers with the corresponding 
convex hulls and results in the locational market prices MWhp /10.15$1   and  
MWhp /00.10$2   in nodes 1 and 2, respectively. Thus, the congestion price is 
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MWh/10.5$ . Consequently, the total uplift equals $510.00 and is comprised of 
payments to producer 1 and FTR holders. The modified approach gives 
)}150,0{(1  prod  for unit 1, and )}0,1{()}0,0{(2  prod  for unit 2. For sufficiently 
small 01  , 02  , we have 
]}150,150[,1|),{()}0,0{()(~ 11111111   guguX  and 
)}0,1{()}0,0{()(~ 22 X . Application of the modified convex hull pricing results in 
the market prices MWhpp /13.15$~~ 21   , which imply zero congestion price, and 
zero total uplift. The outcomes of the both pricing methods are given in Table 10. 
Table 10. The uplift payments for Example 8. 
Convex hull pricing Modified convex hull pricing  
,$*  ,$  Uplift,$ ,$~*  ,$~  Uplift,$ 
Producer 1 -5.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Producer 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
FTR holders 0.00 510.00 510.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total -5.00 510.00 515.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
The proposed method produces zero congestion rent which manifests the facts that 
producer 2 is effectively constrained off and there is no power flow between the 
nodes. Compared to the convex hull pricing, the new approach results in higher 
market prices, which allows the full compensation of the production cost through the 
market price without use of the uplift payment. 
  
6.4 The uninode two-period power system with price-sensitive load 
 
 To illustrate application of the method for a system with time-coupled 
operation, we study the system with active ramp rate constraint. 
Example 9. 
Consider the uninode two-period power market with one producer and one consumer. 
Table 11 contains the producer’s parameters, which are assumed to be time-
independent: 
Table 11. Parameter values for Example 9. 
 MWhg ,min  MWhg ,max  Ramp 
rate, hourMW /  
MWha /,$  No-load 
cost, 
hour/$  
Start-up 
cost,$  
Producer 20 100 50 20.00 80.00 0.00 
 
Initially, the producer’s generating unit is assumed to be online operating with output 
rate of MW50 . Thus, the producer has the cost function 
)(80)(20)( 2121   tttt uuggС x  and the individual feasible set X  given by 
}50};1,0{,5050;,}1,0{,|{ 0120
2maxmin  
ttt gtggRggX guugux . 
The consumer has the fixed load of MWh80  in the first time period and both the fixed 
load of MWh10  and price-sensitive load of MWh30  in the second time period: 
Ydd tt   ),( 21d  with 21   tt YYY , where }80{1 tY  and  ]40,10[2 tY . The 
consumer’s price-sensitive component of the benefit function is given by 
210)(  tdB d . Thus, the ramp-rate constraint provides time coupling between 
different time periods of a given market planning horizon.  
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The primal problem solution is given by 1u*  , )30,80( ** dg . The convex 
hull pricing method substitutes the non-convex cost function of the producer with the 
convex hull (which was explicitly constructed in [31] for two-period power system) 
and gives the market prices MWh/60.31$  and MWh/00.10$  for 1t  and 2t  
respectively with the total uplift of $32.00 payable to the producer. 
Application of the proposed pricing method gives the following. Since demand 
is fixed for 1t , (14) implies that the producer’s possible output for 2t  is no lower 
than MWh30  due to the ramp constraint and is no higher than MWh30  because the 
marginal benefit of the price-sensitive demand is below the marginal cost of output 
for 2t  (i.e., adB t  2/ ). Consequently, we have 
)}30,1{()}80,1{( 2211   ttttprod gugu  and 
}30{}80{ 21   ttсons dd . Hence, for sufficiently small ε , ρ  we have the 
following modified individual feasible sets of the market players. 
}3030,8080,|{)},{()(~ 222111   tttttt ggXX xx0g0uε , 
}3030,|{)}10,80({)(~ 222   ttt dYY dddρ . 
In the limit of 0ρε, , the modified pricing scheme yields the market prices 
MWh/67.32$  and MWh/00.10$  for 1t  and 2t  respectively with zero total uplift. 
The pricing outcomes of the both methods are given in Table 12 (with the consumer’s 
profit reflecting the price-sensitive component only). 
Table 12. The uplift payments for Example 9. 
Convex hull pricing Modified convex hull pricing  
,$*  ,$  Uplift,$ ,$~*  ,$~  Uplift,$ 
Producer 468.00 500.00 32.00 553.33 553.33 0.00 
Consumer 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
The modified convex hull pricing approach states that in this power system the 
producer has no opportunity to supply any output other than MWh80  for 1t  and 
any output other than MWh30  for 2t , (likewise for the consumer). To ensure the 
non-confiscatory pricing for power, the generator state with offline statuses during the 
whole market planning horizon (which is feasible given the generator’s ramp rate and 
the initial condition for its output) is included in the modified individual feasible set 
of the producer. For 1t , this implies distribution of the no-load cost not over the 
maximum output limit of MWh100  (as it is the case in the convex hull pricing 
method) but over the reduced maximum output limit of MWh80 , which results in both 
higher market price and lower total uplift (which is calculated using the modified 
individual feasible sets of the market players).  
 
7. Discussion and conclusion 
 
The convex hull pricing method treats each output (consumption) volume 
allowed by the market player individual operational constraints as possible, although 
some of these volumes may not be technologically and/or economically feasible. We 
propose applying a market framework that economically discourages any deviations 
from the output (consumption) schedule set by the centralized dispatch except for 
those incurred due to participation in the real-time power balancing. In this 
framework, taking into account either technologically and/or economically infeasible 
volumes in the lost profit calculation may result in excessive uplift payments to the 
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market players. For each producer (consumer), we propose identifying both 
technologically and economically feasible output (consumption) volumes as the set of 
power volumes that can be obtained as solutions to the centralized dispatch problem 
with new maximum output and consumption limits of the market players not 
exceeding the corresponding limits used in the original problem. Each of these sets is 
further extended to include both the points in some small neighborhoods of every 
output (consumption) volume from the set (provided that these points also satisfy the 
market player individual operational constraints) and the points ensuring non-
confiscatory pricing for power. In the proposed framework, the resulting sets act as 
the modified individual feasible sets of the corresponding market players in the 
modified individual decentralized dispatch optimization problems, which enter the 
dual problem utilized to calculate the set of market prices and the individual uplifts. 
Thus, the procedure results in extending the constraint set to include new redundant 
constraints each depending on the output (consumption) volume of the corresponding 
market player only. This allows formulating the uniform power pricing mechanism 
without introduction of the new product/services and the associated prices in 
Lagrangian relaxation procedure. Also, contrary to the convex hull pricing method, 
the proposed modified approach entails that to explain the resulting uplift payment to 
a given market player ISO has to pass to it not only the market price but also 
information that is needed to identify the market player’s modified individual feasible 
set. 
The proposed method can be reformulated to fit the widely-used framework 
that each market player faces a rule stating how its output revenue (consumption cost) 
is calculated, and, given this rule, the market player lost profit is calculated using the 
maximum value of its profit on the feasible set specified by its individual (private) 
constraint set. For definiteness, let us consider a producer and replace all the 
additional constraints introduced in the proposed method by extending the generator 
revenue function to include the corresponding penalty functions. For example, for 
each additional constraint consider the penalty function in the form of the indicator 
function of this constraint (which is defined to be equal 0 if the constraint holds and  
 , otherwise). From this point of view, the generator revenue function (before the 
uplift) is the sum of two terms: the linear term (which is the product of the market 
price and the generator output) and the sum of the indicator functions for all the 
additional constraints. This revenue function is utilized to calculate the generator lost 
opportunity cost, which is compensated by the uplift payment, and the market price is 
then obtained by minimizing the total uplift. In this approach, no new constraints are 
explicitly included in the individual feasible set, which is used to calculate the 
generator lost opportunity cost. Also, the indicator functions, which are the nonlinear 
terms in the pre-uplift revenue function, vanish at both the primal problem and 
decentralized dispatch optimal points. Therefore, the resulting generator revenue 
equals the sum of the linear term and the uplift. Thus, the proposed method, which 
results in linear pricing with the uplift but introduces additional constraints, can be 
viewed as a specific mixture of the convex hull pricing and the nonlinear pricing 
without extending the individual feasible set of the market players. The differences 
between the nonlinear pricing methods and the proposed pricing approach are the 
following. The nonlinear pricing generally produces market player specific prices and 
modifies the revenue function so that the primal problem outcome maximizes the 
market player profit in the decentralized dispatch problem, while the proposed 
approach results in a universal market price and individual uplifts (which are needed 
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because the profit maximizing volumes in the individual decentralized dispatch 
problems are generally different from those in the primal problem solution). 
We have showed that the proposed modified convex hull pricing method 
produces the total uplift no higher than that implied by the convex hull pricing 
algorithm and a generally different set of the market prices. The mathematical reason 
for potentially lower total uplift payment is the restriction of market player individual 
feasible sets used in the dual problem that produces both the set of market prices and 
the lost opportunity costs of market players. Also, if the centralized dispatch problem 
becomes convex after optimization over the integral variables, then the proposed 
approach yields the standard marginal prices and zero total uplift payment. 
In case of uninode single-period power systems with fixed load and zero 
minimum output limits, the sets of both technologically and economically feasible 
output volumes and the corresponding modified individual feasible sets were 
explicitly constructed in [28]. For such power systems, the proposed method may 
result in the different sets of market prices and/or total uplift compared to the convex 
hull pricing approach only in the presence of at least one LNMGU [28]. For fixed 
load systems with nonzero minimum output limits we show that (contrary to systems 
with vanishing generator minimum output limits) the modified pricing method yields 
a set of market prices and a total uplift payment generally different from those 
produced by the convex hull pricing approach even if no LNMGU is present in the 
power system.  
We have also illustrated that for power systems with the price-sensitive 
consumer bids the proposed method may produce market pricing (in particular, the 
total uplift payment) that depends on the structure of demand. 
We established the straightforward procedure to find the sets of generator 
output volumes that are both technologically and economically feasible for uninode 
single-period power market with price-sensitive consumer bids and zero minimum 
output limits of all generators. Also, in such power systems we have showed that if 
the consumer bids are composed of the fixed load and/or one-step price-sensitive bids, 
then the consumer original feasible sets (and, therefore, the original demand curves) 
can be used to calculate the set of market prices but not the uplift payments. 
Although we restricted our analysis to the uninode power systems, the 
proposed approach is readily extended to more complex power systems, which 
include multiple nodes, power losses, etc., as these additional constraints can be 
incorporated in (10) and (14).  
If the modified individual feasible sets can be determined only for some of the 
market players, the proposed pricing approach with utilization of the original 
individual feasible sets for the rest of the market players may still lower the total uplift 
needed to ensure economic stability of the centralized dispatch outcome compared to 
the convex hull pricing method. 
The incentives effects due to market power in both the convex hull pricing 
method and the proposed approach are complicated due to multi-part bids and non-
convex individual feasible sets of the market players, which may spawn the gaming 
strategies. On one hand, the modified method utilizes smaller individual feasible sets 
in the lost profit calculation, which may suppress these strategies. On the other hand, 
since a market player bid and stated parameters of its generating unit may influence 
the extra constraints added to the individual feasible set of another market participant 
and the resulting uplifts, such a procedure may stimulate the market power abuse. 
These issues are to be addressed in further research on the subject. 
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